







In the course of recently writing a chapter of a collection of reflections on Hedley Byrne and 
Co. Ltd. v Heller and Partners Ltd.1 published some fifty years after the case was decided,2 I 
was led to a document which I think will be of great interest to those who study that case. In 
his own earlier legal history of Hedley Byrne, Professor Paul Mitchell had discussed the facts 
with direct reference to the first instance judgment which, unlike the appeals, was not 
publicly available.3 Further aided by Professor Mitchell, I was able to locate a transcript of 
this judgment in the Hedley Byrne case papers held in the House of Lords Library, and by the 
efforts of Ms. Jennie Lynch of the Parliamentary Archives these papers have now been 
formally opened for consultation.4 Ms. Lynch supplied me with a copy of the transcript and it 
has been published as an appendix to the collection in which my own chapter has appeared. 
 This first instance decision is a judgment of McNair J. handed down in the Commercial 
Court5 on 20 December 1960. The importance of Hedley Byrne was, of course, that in it the 
House of Lords extended liability for negligence in making a statement beyond the bounds 
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1 [1962] 1 Q.B. 396, [1961] 3 W.L.R. 1225 (C.A.); [1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 3 W.L.R. 101 (H.L.). 
2 D. Campbell, “The Dog that Did Bark in the Night-time: What Mischief Does Hedley Byrne and Co. 
Ltd. v Heller and Partners Correct?” in K. Barker et al., eds, The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from 
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Parliamentary Archives database (Portcullis) is HL/PO/JUU/4/3/1107. Other papers are held in 
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identified with Derry v Peek6 so as to create, let us allow for the purposes of argument, 
despite a leading authority having said outright that the name of the tort is essentially 
misleading,7 a tort of negligent misstatement. I do not want to go in any detail into the 
difficulties of the law of negligent misstatement. I want, with reference to the now readily 
available transcript,8 to show that the defendant, Heller and Partners Ltd., was not even 
negligent. I long ago provisionally formed this opinion after study of the statements of the 
facts and the quotations of the first instance judgment in the reports of the appellate 
judgments.9 But it will be argued that the full transcript of the first instance judgment, which, 
for reasons which will emerge,10 even more than one usually expects discussed the facts in 
greater detail than they were discussed on appeal, confirms that the defendant was not 
negligent. I will briefly conclude by reflecting on the pernicious effects of the absence of 
negligence in Hedley Byrne itself on the law of negligent misstatement as it has since been 
developed. 
 
WHY WERE HELLER AND PARTNERS NOT LIABLE? 
I will be extremely brief about the basic facts of Hedley Byrne, which will be thoroughly well 
known to any reader of this paper. When considering whether to undertake a commission for 
a manufacturer, Easipower Ltd, which, because the commission had to be carried out 
effectively on a del credere basis, the claimant advertising agency feared would put it at a 
particular financial risk of between £8,000 to £9,000 (now circa £175,000), the claimant 
requested its bank, National Provincial Ltd., to obtain a credit reference for Easipower. The 
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National Provincial made telephone inquiry of the defendant, Easipower’s bank, and was 
later that day given by telephone what it understood to be a satisfactory reference, the 
substance of which it almost immediately communicated to the claimant. When Easipower 
shortly thereafter went into liquidation, leaving the claimant with a loss even greater than it 
feared (356), the claimant brought an action in what was to become negligent misstatement 
against the defendant. 
 I, like I am sure many others, can testify to the difficulty of explaining to students the 
actual finding in Hedley Byrne, which was that the defendant was not liable. If we put aside 
the specific remoteness argument raised by the defendant,11 for the poor students now are 
told that their painfully acquired learning of proximity is even more of a snare when it comes 
to understanding negligent misstatement than it is when it comes to understanding everything 
else about negligence, the first thing that must be explained is the existence of a disclaimer. 
The claimant’s bank did not require or pay for the defendant to undertake a specific inquiry 
into Easipower’s creditworthiness, and the reference was given “without making any charge 
for it and in the usual way”12 as an instance of common13 commercial courtesy.14 I shall 
return to this but for the moment wish to note only that the reference, as with references of 
this kind, had been sought on the basis that it would be given “without responsibility on [the 
defendant’s] part”, and it was given with an explicit disclaimer to this effect.15 As it then 
respected the parties’ voluntary establishment of the bounds to their liabilities in a way which 
the law of negligence in general and the law of negligent misstatement in particular has since 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 i.e. remoteness on the facts, not in terms of the general issue of pure economic loss. This argument 
failed before those who considered it in the House of Lords: Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 482 (Lord 
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13 Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 489 
14 Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 503. 




worked against, the House of Lords was not going to find liability in Hedley Byrne itself. 
Even Lord Devlin, whose speech most closely prefigured what was to become the law of 
negligent misstatement,16 accepted that “A man cannot be said voluntarily to be undertaking 
a responsibility if at the very moment when he is said to be accepting it he declares that in 
fact he is not”.17 This adds to the puzzlement of Hedley Byrne when viewed, as it almost 
never is, as private litigation, for one cannot but wonder how satisfactory the claimant found 
its use of the civil courts when it became clear to it that law reform had been funded by its 
taking an action it could have had little hope of winning so far as the Lords.18 
 Confusion is by no means lessened when the possible liability of the defendant absent 
the disclaimer is considered. The often difficult distinction between whether a duty of care is 
owed and whether, if owed, it has been breached must be drawn at this point. In Hedley 
Byrne the House of Lords created tort liability for negligent misstatement as an, as it were, 
abstract or general point of law. But, as I shall argue, neither Pearson L.J., speaking for the 
entire Court of Appeal, nor four of their Lordships regarded Heller and Partners Ltd. as 
having breached the new duty. Given the disclaimer, the House of Lords believed itself to be 
relieved of the necessity of deciding or even hearing argument whether the defendant had 
actually been negligent in the sense of giving the reference carelessly, which the defendant 
denied at all hearings of the case.19 As the Court of Appeal had taken the same line,20 this left 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
16 See n.46 below. 
17 Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 533. See also 492 (Lord Reid), 504 (Lord Morris), 511 (Lord 
Hodson), 539-40 (Lord Pearce). 
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narrowly interpreted as exemptions from negligence should be, the disclaimer did not cover the defendant’s 
conduct: Hedley Byrne [1962] 1 Q.B. 396 (C.A.) at 414. As it did not find that there was a duty of care, the 
Court of Appeal did not feel obliged to comment on this argument. That such a challenge to the disclaimer was 
essential to the claimant’s prospects of success was recognised in the House of Lords, but the realistic 
possibility of such a challenge was quickly dismissed: Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 492-93 (Lord 
Reid), 504 (Lord Morris), 511 (Lord Hodson), 540 (Lord Pearce). Lord Devlin did not consider the argument, 
but the dicta just quoted in the main text surely shows that he did not think it even merited specific refutation.  
19 Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 481, 493, 505. 




the finding of McNair J. that the defendant had been negligent in this sense intact though 
unconfirmed on appeal, but nevertheless this finding is, I believe, the point on which the case 
has all but universally been thought to hang. 
 The overwhelmingly dominant interpretation of Hedley Byrne is that: (1) the defendant 
gave the reference negligently; and (2) this would have amounted to a breach of the duty of 
care which was, as a general and abstract matter, found to exist by the House of Lords; except 
that (3) even if such a duty had been in force, it was successfully disclaimed. It is, in truth, 
impossible to construct a ratio to this effect from the five speeches handed down by their 
Lordships, and so, as Professor Stevens quickly pointed out, Hedley Byrne is worthless as 
precedent, which has had the effect that, even if one swallows the principle of judicial 
legislation, this act of judicial legislation was marred from the outset because it was wholly 
unclear what had been legislated.21 To this day it remains, of course, highly controversial 
what the basis and scope of liability in tort for negligent misstatement are. 
  I nevertheless submit that some idea of the defendant’s negligent blameworthiness, 
though I would be the last to say it can coherently be defined, is essential to Hedley Byrne 
and to the tort of negligent misstatement, in the sense that we would not think of finding the 
defendant liable if it were not in some way negligently blameworthy. Surely the new tort, the 
absence of which Denning L.J. had in Candler v Crane, Christmas and Co. taken to be 
evidence that England and Wales were not “in a state of civilisation”,22 must be directed at 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 Stevens, “Hedley Byrne v Heller” (1964) 27 M.L.R. 121 at 125 even goes so far as to say that Hedley 
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22 [1951] 2 K.B. 164 at 176, [1951] 1 All E.R. 426 (C.A.) at 431C, quoting Slim v Croucher (1860) 1 De 




some fault? Pearson L.J. for the Court of Appeal23 and Lord Reid in the first speech in the 
Lords both set the scene, as it were, by referring to McNair J.’s conclusion that the defendant 
had been negligent, therefore setting up the existing law’s inability to possibly ground 
liability for that negligence as a problem the appeal courts should address. As Lord Reid put 
it at the beginning of his speech: 
“The appellants now seek to recover [their] loss from the respondents as damages 
on the ground that these replies were given negligently and in breach of the 
respondent’s duty to exercise care in giving them. In his judgment McNair J. said 
… ‘I have no hesitation in holding (1) that Mr. Heller was guilty of negligence in 
giving such a reference without making plain – as he did not – that it was 
intended to be a very guarded reference, and (2) that properly understood 
according to its ordinary and natural meaning the reference was not justified by 
facts known to Mr. Heller’”.24  
But, as I shall now show, the detailed examination of McNair’s judgment that is now possible 
shows that this conclusion was quite wrong. 
 
THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT 
The better student who actually reads the reports of the appellate judgments is also puzzled to 
find that the case was not even originally framed in terms of negligence but in terms of 
fraud.25 The obvious advantage of this was that a finding of fraud would bring the claim 
under Derry v Peek, but the allegation of fraud was abandoned at trial (345), apparently on 
the first morning of the six day hearing,26 and McNair J. accepted the defendant’s honesty 
“without reservation” (350, 354). Some discussion of this allegation is, however, of interest 
as it bears on the question of the defendant’s negligence. 
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 In its capacity as Easipower’s bank, the defendant had extended various forms of 
finance to, and was itself a very substantial creditor of, Easipower (348-51). The facts, of 
course, arose only because Easipower and Pena Industries Ltd., the company of which 
Easipower was a subsidiary, were in serious financial difficulty, and whilst Easipower had 
definite prospects,27 it was at the time the reference was given wholly dependent on financing 
from the defendant for its survival.28 It was indeed the defendant, when it no longer wished to 
continue with this arrangement, that put Easipower into liquidation (351). As a secured bank 
creditor, the defendant recovered 100% of its debt plus interest, doing much better out of the 
insolvency than the claimant, an unsecured trade creditor which recovered at most 25% of 
what it was owed and perhaps much less (351-52, 356).29 The defendant’s possible 
motivation for intentionally misleading the claimant would have been that it led the claimant 
to refrain from cancelling orders which would have reduced its exposure to Easipower 
(345),30 for this would have further diminished Easipower’s prospects, in which, of course, 
the defendant had an interest. Speculating with the aid of the now available case papers,31 one 
could perhaps begin to form an opinion about the wisdom of the law regulating banks’ use of 
insolvency proceedings in general and sympathise with the claimant harbouring resentment 
against the defendant in this particular case. Indeed, one could go on to sympathise with 
McNair J.’s own expression of such resentment (353-54). But it must be repeated that the 
allegation of fraud was abandoned at the start of the trial and I have not been able to find 
evidence of fraud in any of the now publicly available materials. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
27 Stevens, “Hedley Byrne v Heller” (1964) 27 M.L.R. 121 at n.6 tells us that, after these events, a re-
formed Easipower resumed trading as Dreamland Electrical Appliances Ltd., and effectively this company 
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and cancelling after a refusal to do so, a refusal which the evidence seems to show would have been very likely 
or even inevitable (350). 
31 In further research I shall attempt to explain McNair J.’s reasoning in detail, but this is not necessary 




 On 18 August 1958, one Mr. Draycott, the claimant’s Company Secretary, asked one 
Mr. Webber, Assistant Manager of the Piccadilly Branch of the National Provincial where the 
claimant banked, for a reference concerning Easipower’s ability to meet a debt of up to 
£9,000. The terms on which this reference was sought from and was given by the defendant 
are recorded in a minute of a telephone conversation of the same date between an employee 
of the City office of the National Provincial and Mr. Lipman Heller, a Director of Heller and 
Partners Ltd., dictated by Mr. Heller and accepted as accurate before McNair J. It was Mr. 
Heller who, after consultation with his brother Mr. Isadore Heller, the Chief Administrative 
Officer of the defendant, gave the telephone reference. His minute read:32 
“Heller & Partners Limited. Minute of telephone conversation National 
Provincial Bank Ltd. Call from 15, Bishopsgate, EC2. Date 18.8.58. Person 
called, L Heller. re Easipower Ltd. They wanted to know in confidence and 
without responsibility on our part, the respectability and standing of Easipower 
Limited and whether they would be good for an advertising contract for £8/9,000. 
I reply, the Company recently opened an account with us, believed to be 
respectably constituted and considered good for its normal business engagements. 
The Company is a subsidiary of Pena Industries Ltd. which is in liquidation, but 
we understand that the Managing Director, Mr Williams, is endeavouring to buy 
the shares of Easipower Limited from the liquidator. We believe that the 
Company would not undertake any commitments they are unable to fulfil 
(346)”.33 
Mr. Webber replied to Mr. Draycott by telephone later that day and three days later sent him 
the following written confirmation of their conversation: 
“Confirmation of our telephoned reply. 21st August, 1958. Confidential. For your 
private use and without responsibility on the part of this Bank or the Manager. 
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd. Dear Sir, In reply to your telephone inquiry of 18th 
August Bankers say: ‘The subject recently opened an account with us. It is a 
respectably constituted Company and is considered good for business 
engagements. It is a subsidiary of Pena Industries Limited, which is in 
liquidation, but we understand that Mr Williams the Managing Director of E Ltd, 
is endeavouring to buy the shares of E Ltd from the liquidators. We feel the 
subject Company would not undertake commitments it could not fulfill.’ Yours 
faithfully (346)”. 
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it was quoted in part in the House of Lords: Hedley Byrne [1962] 1 Q.B. 396 (C.A.) at 398; [1964] A.C. 465 




Acting on this reference, Mr. J.O. Hedley, the Chairman and Managing Director of the 
claimant, agreed to undertake the commission for Easipower on the usual effectively del 
credere basis and to bear the concomitant risk. 
 After reviewing the evidence of the financial difficulties of Pena Industries and 
Easipower (348-49), McNair J. formed the view that, as of 18 August 1958, Easipower, 
which on that date had an overdraft of £53,865 (now circa £1.15 million), was either actually 
“insolvent” or “showing all the signs of early insolvency” (349). Even when a troubled 
company’s affairs are not as complicated as those of Pena Industries and Easipower, such 
things are, of course, matters of judgement about which parties can legitimately differ,34 and 
the defendant nevertheless continued to finance the company after 18 August, albeit in a way 
which made plain its concern, until it refused to honour a cheque for £2,711 in favour of the 
claimants on 2 December 1958. But as the facts about Easipower’s perilous state were, of 
course, known to Mr. Heller, McNair J. further formed the view that, in effect, the reference 
did not sufficiently convey the threat of Easipower’s insolvency. He was in particular critical 
of what was said in connection with one Mr. F.A. Williams. Mr. Williams founded and 
successfully developed Easipower prior to its acquisition by Pena Industries (346), after 
which he continued as Managing Director of Easipower. When Pena Industries got into 
difficulties, Mr. Williams personally attempted to buy back Easipower (348-49). As the 
Messrs. Heller had “complete faith” in Mr. Williams’ “capacity and integrity” (348), Mr. 
Lipman Heller could view this as a very positive possible development, as did McNair J., 
who found this repurchase to be a ‘vital fact that the survival of Easipower Limited as a 
trading concern depended upon’ (350). But McNair J. also found that whether Mr. Williams 
would be successful in his attempt to buy Easipower was an “uncertain contingency” (350). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 





 It was essentially the failure of the reference to sufficiently convey the possibility of 
insolvency in the light of these facts known to Mr. Heller that led McNair J. to reach his 
conclusion that the defendant was negligent which has, as it appears in the speech of Lord 
Reid, been quoted above, but which, for the sake of convenience, I quote again: 
“I have no hesitation in holding (1) that Mr. Heller was guilty of negligence in 
giving such a reference without making plain – as he did not – that it was 
intended to be a very guarded reference, and (2) that properly understood 
according to its ordinary and natural meaning the reference was not justified by 
facts known to Mr. Heller (350)”.  
 On 4 November 1958 another reference was sought by National Provincial on behalf of 
the claimant and given by the defendant (351). This reference does in fact raise some 
significant additional issues but its essential nature may be regarded as of a piece with the 18 
August reference and, for reasons of brevity, I will not discuss this later reference.  
 In his testimony, Mr. Lipman Heller could not and did not deny that the reference had 
actually failed sufficiently to convey the threat of insolvency. His defence was more 
sophisticated. McNair J. gave the following account of it in his judgment: 
“Mr Heller … stated that he regarded the reference … as a very guarded 
reference, and stated that it contained three red lights or warnings. First, that the 
statement that ‘the Company recently opened an account with us’ meant that he 
could only speak from a short experience of the account; secondly, that the 
expression ‘good for its normal business engagements’, unqualified by the words 
‘including your figures’ indicated that no expression of opinion was made as to 
its creditworthiness for £8,000 or £9,000. It was conceded that the omission of the 
word ‘normal’ when the reference was passed on to the Plaintiffs is immaterial. 
Thirdly, that the statement that ‘the Company is a subsidiary of Pena Industries 
Limited which is in liquidation’ was a warning to make further inquiries before 
giving extended credit, because the liquidator could put the Company into 
liquidation at any moment. Mr Heller agreed that the qualifying phrase introduced 
by the word ‘but’ was a balancing factor, though he stated that the light was still 
glowing red. At the conclusion of his evidence, I stated that I would infer that he 
would give the most favourable reference he could for his clients and that 




information available to him. Mr Heller agreed that this was the correct inference 
(350)”.35 
With this interpretation of the reference, McNair J. flatly disagreed: 
“In my judgment, whatever may be the meaning which certain expressions in the 
reference may be understood to have as between bankers — and on this the 
evidence was not very precise — the reference as a whole and the particular 
expressions relied upon cannot as a matter of construction reasonably be held to 
bear the interpretation which Mr Heller seeks to place upon it or them. As a 
matter of construction, I would regard the reference, as Mr Hedley did, as a 
favourable reference for £8,000 to £9,000 without any real qualification, and that 
it meant that Easipower Limited could safely be granted credit for that sum 
(350)”. 
 I think that this passage is, with respect, entirely wrong and I will argue this in the next 
section of this paper. Before doing so, however, a final finding, if this is the right word, of 
fact by McNair J., which is not even alluded to in the appellate judgments, must be 
mentioned. We have seen that on 18 August Mr. Webber of the National Provincial 
communicated the gist of the reference he had been given by Mr. Heller to Mr. Draycott, the 
claimant’s Company Secretary, by telephone, confirming this in writing three days later. It 
appears that Mr. Draycott had a written note made of this conversation and of this McNair J 
said: 
“For completeness I should add that there is a contemporary note in the 
handwriting of Mr Draycott’s secretary which purports to record the summary of 
a telephone conversation on 18th May as follows: ‘August 18th.’ phoned Bank 
who gave a fair but guarded report upon future credit angle of new set-up’, but as 
neither Mr Draycott nor Mr Webber was able to confirm this conversation I make 
no finding as to its accuracy (347-48)”. 
I will return to this note.36 
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT FOR BANKERS GIVING CREDIT REFERENCES 
Putting aside the general law of misstatement, Gardiner Q.C. for the claimants was right 
insistently to argue before the House of Lords that the proper regulation37 of an important 
specific commercial practice, that of banker’s giving credit references as a matter of 
commercial courtesy, was at issue in Hedley Byrne.38 McNair J. had put the issue this way: 
“Apart from authority there would be much to be said for the view that a person 
who answers an inquiry as to the credit worthiness of another, knowing that the 
inquirer will probably act upon the answer, should be held to be under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in giving the answer and to be answerable in damages if 
the answer proves to have been given negligently (352)”. 
It is, with respect, submitted that, throughout his judgment, McNair J. fails to give 
appropriate weight to its being simply normal for a commercial party seeking to obtain the 
benefit of such a duty (and such a liability) as he describes to do so by contracting for it, i.e. 
by paying for the advice, although he would, of course, have been perfectly well aware of this 
in a general sense. I have explored the overall position at length in my chapter on Hedley 
Byrne which I have mentioned. Here I want to briefly argue that, once the importance of 
payment is appreciated, then it is clear that the defendant in Hedley Byrne was not negligent. 
We have seen that McNair J. was very sceptical of Mr. Lipman Heller’s claim to have used 
expressions in a way which would be perfectly well known to convey caution to bankers 
(350). I do not wish to engage in a general discussion of the interpretation of the ‘implicit 
dimensions’ of parties (near-)contractual relationships.39 I want to focus on the specific 
significance of the absence of payment.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
37 R.H. Coase, “Advertising and Free Speech” (1977) 6 Journal of Legal Studies 1 at 5: “Economic 
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‘regulation’ … is often confined to the work of the [executive], but regulation is also the result of legislative and 
judicial actions, and it seems ill-advised not to take these into consideration”. 
38 Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 472-73. 
39 D. Campbell and H. Collins, ‘Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contract’ in D. Campbell et al., 




 If the claimant wanted a detailed investigation made of Easipower’s finances on which 
it could confidently rely to protect it from the risk of assuming the del credere obligations it 
undertook, it would have had to take steps very different from those it did take. It would have 
had to pay for such an investigation by accountants or other business analysts (perhaps as 
employees or agents of its bank) who were able to secure access to normally private 
information about Easipower (and Pena Industries). Such parties will by default be liable in 
contract, not merely for fraud, but for negligence assessed against the background of the 
scope and scale of the investigation and the size of the payment for it.40 This is a very long 
way from the facts of Hedley Byrne. It is not so much that, in fact, the defendant gave the 
reference almost immediately in a brief, impromptu telephone conversation as that in an 
important sense informal references of this kind cannot be thought to be able to provide a full 
assessment of the likelihood of default,41 and, the crucial point, it cannot reasonably be 
thought that they even seek to do it; indeed it is ridiculous to think they do.42 
 What can the claimant reasonably be thought to have hoped to obtain from for a 
reference requested in the way they requested it? Surely it cannot have amounted to much 
more than a duty to honestly disclose any blatant evidence that Easipower had a bad 
commercial character. One might speculate about situations in which negligence constituted a 
breach of this duty, such as a bank confusing the company about which it clearly had been 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
40 At the cost of pointing out the obvious, negligently making a statement would breach the duty to take 
reasonable care which is of the essence of a contract to provide professional advice and the like now codified 
under the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 s. 13 (c. 29). Exclusion of this liability between commercial 
parties is now regulated under s. 16 and, behind this, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (c. 50). It is, of 
course, possible to contract for strict liability for a statement’s being incorrect, but it is extremely difficult to 
conceive of a party making a statement on this basis. 
41 For reasons of brevity and because I do not seek precisely to describe the actual duties a banker 
undertakes when giving references of this kind I put to one side the important point, a sort of conflict of interest 
point, raised by Lord Reid, about how frank one can reasonably expect a bank to be about its customer’s 
position when replying to an inquiry of this sort: Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 489. In the passage of 
his judgment quoted in the text accompanying n.35 above, McNair J. seems to have  interpreted this point 
somewhat to the disadvantage of Mr. Lipman Heller (350). 
42 I would not presume to develop this theme further than it was set out, before the House of Lords 
judgment had even reached the Law Reports, by the late Mr. Weir in the first of those casenotes which 




asked to provide a reference with another similarly named company, but such speculation is 
far fetched and must raise the concept of “gross negligence” which the law of England and 
Wales does not use in drawing the line between fraud and negligence.43 To ground liability, 
the sort of act or omission which speculation brings to mind must support a finding of fraud, 
and so a breach of the duty of honesty to which Heller and Partners Ltd. unarguably was 
subject, but which the claimant accepted it had not breached. 
 After an extensive review of authority on the nature of bankers’ duties when giving 
references of this sort, all these points were in effect put forward on the basis of their 
substance by Pearson L.J.: 
“Apart from authority, I am not satisfied that it would be reasonable to impose 
upon a banker the obligation suggested, if that obligation really adds anything to 
the duty of giving an honest answer. It is conceded by Mr. Cooke [for the 
claimant] that the banker is not expected to make outside inquiries to supplement 
the information which he already has. Is he then expected, in business hours in 
the bank’s time, to expend time and trouble in searching records, studying 
documents, weighing and comparing the favourable and unfavourable features 
and producing a well-balanced and well-worded report? That seems wholly 
unreasonable. Then, if he is not expected to do any of those things, and if he is 
permitted to give an impromptu answer in the words that immediately come to his 
mind on the basis of the facts which he happens to remember or is able to 
ascertain from a quick glance at the file or one of the files, the duty of care seems 
to add little, if anything, to the duty of honesty. If the answer given is seriously 
wrong, that is some evidence - of course, only some evidence - of dishonesty. 
Therefore, apart from authority, it is far from clear, to my mind, that the banker, 
in answering such an inquiry, could reasonably be supposed to be assuming any 
duty higher than that of giving an honest answer”.44 
The Court of Appeal’s position was also taken, though less fully argued, by all their 
Lordships45 save Lord Devlin.46 Were it not for the disclaimer (and some confusion attendant 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
43 Armitage v Nurse [1997] Ch. 241, [1997] 3 W.L.R.1046 (C.A.) at 254B-E. 
44 Hedley Byrne [1962] 1 Q.B. 396 (C.A.) at 414-15. 
45 Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 489 (Lord Reid), 503-504 (Lord Morris), 512-14 (Lord 
Hodson), 539-40 (Lord Pearce). 
46 The entire point of Lord Devlin’s speech – the core statement of Hedley Byrne liability as it has been 
developed - was to treat an ‘assumption of responsibility’ without ‘consideration’ as ‘equivalent to contract’, 
i.e., as I have argued in my chapter to which I have referred, to erase the difference between the liability one 
undertakes under a contract for which one is paid and the liability imposed on one, under the name of an 




on the discussion of the existence of the duty of care), the ratio of Hedley Byrne would be 
that the defendant was not liable because it was not negligent.  
 The position of the National Provincial has been inadequately examined in the 
enormous case law and academic literature on Hedley Byrne. We have seen that Mr. Lipman 
Heller of the defendant communicated the reference by telephone to the National Provincial 
and that Mr. Webber of the National Provincial in turn communicated the reference to Mr. 
Draycott, the claimant’s Company Secretary, by telephone followed by written confirmation. 
Examination of the texts of Mr. Heller’s agreed note of what he had said and of Mr. 
Webber’s confirmation, quoted above,47 shows them to be in almost all material respects 
identical.48 If the defendant had concealed undeniable evidence of Easipower’s inability to 
meet its liabilities, this would have been a fraud by the defendant which deceived the 
National Provincial in a way which left the National Provincial blameless. But this was not at 
all the issue. The issue was a matter of what the claimant could reasonably infer from the 
honest reference given. The National Provincial effectively simply transmitted the 
defendant’s reference. Why, if the defendant was negligent, was the National Provincial also 
not negligent? If anything, the National Provincial might have been expected to add a 
commentary on what a commercial party might and might not expect to learn from a banker’s 
reference. The National Provincial was at least being paid, albeit not in a specifically itemised 
manner, for the reference which it conveyed to the claimant. 
 But this is to speculate beyond the facts of the case, for surely the now available note 
Mr. Draycott had made of how he understood the reference he had received49 confirms what 
one might conclude from reading the appellate judgments in Hedley Byrne as an, as it were, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
47 See text accompanying n.33 above. 
48 One point of divergence, the omission of the word ‘normal’ in the defendant’s reference as it was 
conveyed to the claimant, which seems to be to the pronounced disadvantage of the National Provincial, was 
conceded to be ‘immaterial’: see the quotation from McNair J.s judgment in the text accompanying  n.35 above.  




obiter decision on the facts of the case rather than as judicial legislation. This note shows 
how the commercial parties involved had actually understood the bankers’ expressions which 
McNair J. puts to one side. The claimant’s view of the reference it had received, formed 
within the framework of what commercial parties could in general expect from a reference of 
this nature, was that it was guarded but disclosed no blatant evidence of commercial bad 
character. This being so, it is submitted incontrovertible that the defendant in Hedley Byrne 
was not negligent. This was not, of course, directly relevant to the obiter judicial legislation 
that was carried out. But that the tort of negligent misstatement was founded on a case in 
which there was no negligence and no misstatement goes some way to explaining the nature 
of the subsequent career of this tort. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Why McNair J. dismissed Mr. Draycott’s note in the way he did is something about which I 
am at present unable to hazard any sort of concrete view.50 It is obvious that some strong 
belief that Denning L.J. had been entirely right that the law of liability for negligent 
misstatement as it stood at the time of Candler v Crane, Christmas and Co. evidenced a want 
of civilisation was in the air as Hedley Byrne wound its way through the courts in the early 
60s.51 Drawing very heavily on Mitchell’s legal history, I have tried to describe this belief in 
my chapter on Hedley Byrne which I have mentioned. In this description the imposing figure 
of Baron Gardiner features prominently. Gerald Gardiner Q.C. sat on the Committee which in 
1962 produced the Report52 that led to the passage of the Misrepresentation Act 1967,53 and 
was Lord Chancellor in the Wilson Governments of 1964-70 when that Act was passed. A 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
50 See n.31 above. 
51 Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law (London: Butterworths, 1979) at p.237: ‘Fourteen years later my 
dissent in Candler v Crane Christmas was approved by the House of Lords’. 
52 Law Reform Committee, Tenth Report: Innocent Misrepresentation (Cmnd 1782, 1962). 




very active member of the Labour Party and a noted political campaigner on numerous causes 
particularly related to legal issues, he had in 1963 co-edited a very influential book on law 
reform which included a demand by Aubrey Diamond, then Reader in Law at the L.S.E., that 
Lord Denning’s dissent in Candler should be made the law.54 For reasons that are unclear but 
can hardly be traced to a deficiency in the previous advocacy or advocate,55 in the Lords 
Gardiner replaced S.B.R. Cooke Q.C., who had argued its case in the Court of Appeal, as 
leading counsel for the claimant,56 one of Mr. Gardiner’s arguments having been discussed 
above.57 Some thread undoubtedly emerges. But even Mitchell’s researches leave what went 
on, as it were, behind the scenes in Hedley Byrne known but inadequately and, given the 
extreme importance of the case, it is to be hoped that someone who, unlike the present author, 
has the competence to do so, will do further work in Mitchell’s vein, which was, of course, 
the metier of the late Professor Brian Simpson. 
 If my knowledge of the history Hedley Byrne leaves me incapable of adequately 
explaining how what was done in that case was done, I am of the opinion that my knowledge 
of the subsequent history of the tort of negligent misstatement leaves me perfectly capable of 
forming a judgement on that tort: it should be abolished. The case for this that I have made in 
the chapter I have mentioned is that Hedley Byrne addresses no actual mischief. I hope here 
to have additionally shown that Hedley Byrne - though it did not do this itself - created the 
possibility of punishing conduct which is not even negligent, unless negligence is understood 
as allowing oneself to be the last solvent person in range of scattergun fire. This possibility 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
54 A. Diamond, “The Law of Contract and Tort” in G. Gardiner and A. Martin, eds., Law Reform NOW 
(London: Victor Gollancz, 1963) at pp.74–75 
55 Mitchell, “Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd. v Heller and Partners Ltd. (1963)” in Mitchell and Mitchell, 
eds., Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort, at p. 182. 
56 The process of appointing the panel which eventually handed down the Lords judgment was a 
convoluted one in particular because Lord Radcliffe had to withdraw from the case in order to serve on the 
Vassall Tribunal. Professor Swain reports that, when counsel for the claimant, Gardiner “is said to have 
persuaded the Lord Chancellor, Lord Dilhorne, to include more common law judges on the new panel”: W. 
Swain, “Hedley Byrne v Heller in Australia” in Barker et al., eds, The Law of Misstatements, at n.15. 




has, I trust it is unarguable, been realised on many subsequent occasions,58 and these have 
been so bad as to have been found disquieting even by the standards we perforce have had to 
adopt when evaluating what passes for the law of negligence after Donoghue v Stevenson.59 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
58 An example I myself find particularly striking is Merrett v Babb [2001] Q.B. 1174, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 1 
(C.A.), a deplorable development of the line taken in Yianni v Edwin Evans and Sons [1982] Q.B. 483, [1981] 3 
W.L.R. 843 (Q.B.D.) and approved in Smith v Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 A.C. 831, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 790 (H.L.). 
59 [1932] A.C. 562, 1932 S.C. 31 (H.L.). 
